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CHAPTER 5 
Torts 
MICHAEL E. MONE* 
AND 
JOHN FINN** 
§ 6.1. Introduction. As past volumes of the Sur ey have pointed 
out, MaBBachusetts law in the tort field has undergon rapid change in 
the last ten years. The Supreme Judicial Court has tu ed from a strict 
stare decisis adherence to old principles and shown increasing will-
ingness to examine and change old case law. 
Judicial decisions in such areas as loss of consorti 
safety changes, licensee-invitee status, recovery for 
familial immunity and the malpractice locality rul represent just a 
partial list of major advancements in the liberalizati n of substantive 
rights in personal injury cases. These cases represen a change in the 
earlier philosophy of the Supreme Judicial Court th t court-made law 
should only be changed by legislative action. With the exception of 
governmental immunity which the Court continues to refer to the legis-
lature, all other tort doctrines are being updated a particular cases 
reach the Court. 
In this Survey year the Court has not made the dr matic changes as 
in some past years, but it has indicated it will co tinue to follow a 
philosophy of bringing MaBSachusetts tort law into t e mainstream of 
modem American tort law. The Court, particularly in decisions regard-
ing mental injury• and choice of law, z has demonstrate its commitment 
to reasoned change. 
§ 6.2. Standard of Care of Landlord-Duty to T nants' Visitors. 
It has long been the law in Massachusetts that a 1 lord owes to the 
guests of his tenants the same duty which he owes to his tenants. That 
duty is to "use reasonable care to keep the commo passageways re-
* Michael E. Mone is a partner in the Boston law f1rm of Esdai e, Barrett & Esdaile. 
** John Finn is an 8880Ciate at Esdaile, Barrett & Esdaile. 
§ 5.1. 1 See § 5.4 infra. 
1 See § 5.8 infra. 
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maining in the control of the landlord in the same condition in which 
they were or appeared to be at the time of the creation of the tenancy."' 
This common law rule as to the duty owed tenants' guests has now been 
rejected by the Supreme Judicial Court. In Lindsey v. Massios, 2 the 
Court held that a "landowner's duty of reasonable care in maintaining 
property he controls extends to all lawful visitors on his premises . . . 
including the lawful visitors of his tenants."3 
In Lindsey, the plaintiff was a guest of one of the defendant's tenants. 
The tenant occupied an apartment on the third floor of the defendant's 
building. 4 The plaintiff, who had been visiting the tenant, left the apart-
ment around 7:00p.m. and discovered that the bulb in the second floor 
landing light fixture was missing. 5 She continued down the stairs but 
slipped and fell, injuring her left ankle.6 Evidence admitted at the trial 
indicated that the light bulb had been missing for more than a week and 
that the stairway was in poor repair during the same period.7 
In determining the landlord's duty to the plaintiff, the Court exam-
ined the reasoning of its opinion in Mounsey v. Ellard. 8 In Mounsey, the 
· Court abolished the common law distinction between "licensees" and 
"invitees." In its place, the Court created "a common duty of reasonable 
care which the occupier [of real property] owes to all lawful visitors."u 
Finding that the reasoning of Mounsey applied with equal force here, 
the Lindsey Court stated: 
The Mounsey rule and its underlying policy rationally apply to all 
persons whose only relationship to the premises on which they are 
injured is that of a lawful visitor. Modem values and the realities 
of urban living favor protection of personal safety over rights of 
absolute property control and demonstrate no logical basis for dis-
tinguishing among persons who enter private property for various 
legitimate purposes. Neither the landowner's conduct in maintain-
ing premises in his control nor the visitor's need for legal protection 
of his safety depends on the visitor's status as business acquaint-
ance, social acquaintance or public official. Similarly, the status 
of the person visited, landowner or lessee, should not affect the 
§ 5.2. 1 Marsh v. Goldstein, 341 Mass. 83, 85, 167 N.E.2d 158, 160 (1960); Russo v. 
Rizzo, 302 Mass. 177, 178, 19 N.E.2d 45, 46 (1939). 
' 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 381, 360 N.E.2d 631. 
3 /d. at 384-85, 360 N.E.2d at 634 (citation omitted). 
• ld. at 381, 360 N.E.2d at 633. 
• Id. at 381-82, 360 N.E.2d at 633. 
• ld. at 382, 360 N.E.2d at 633. 
7 /d. 
• 363 Mass. 693, 297 N.E.2d 43 (1973). 
' Id. at 707, 297 N.E.2d at 51. 
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visitor's right to personal safety or the landowner's o6ligation rea-
sonably to maintain premises in his control. 10 I 
In addition to extending a landowner's duty of reasonable care to all 
lawful visitors on his premises, including guests of his teryants, the Court 
in Lindsey also held that "violation of a safety statute constitutes evi-
dence of negligence in any action by a person whose o~ly relationship 
to the premises where the injury occurred is that of a lawful visitor."" 
By so holding, the Court refused to follow a line of case' which reached 
a contrary result on this issue.12 The Court reasoned that these older 
cases, decided at a time when "a landlord's duty to his tenants' visitors 
was defined by the safety conditions which existed at the commence-
ment of the tenancy" should no longer control in light 1 of the new rule 
announced in Lindsey. 13 ' 
The most interesting issue left open in Lindsey conc~med the land-
lord's duty of care to his tenants. The Court specifically declined to 
consider or decide whether the duty of reasonable care1now recognized 
as owing to all lawful visitors is owed to tenants as well. 14 The Court, 
however, referred to Perry v. Medeiros, 16 where a landlqrd's violation of 
a safety statute was held to be evidence of his neglige~ce in an action 
by a tenant.•• The statute in question in Perry concemeq the positioning 
of doors at the top of a stairway. The Court in that ca$e, however, did 
not depart from the common law rule that a landlo~d's duty to his 
tenant is "to use reasonable care to keep the common areas in as good 
a condition as that in which they were or appeared to qe at the time of 
the creation of the tenancy."17 In a Survey year cas$ subsequent to 
Lindsey, 18 the Court again declined to reevaluate the duty running from 
landlord to tenant, because the issue had not been bri~fed or argued." 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 384, 360 N.E.2d at 634. 
11 /d. at 386, 360 N .E.2d at 634. 
12 /d. at 385-86, 360 N.E.2d at 634. See, e.g., Stapleton v. Cohen, ~53 Mass. 53, 56, 228 
N.E.2d 64, 66 (1967). ' 
13 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 386, 360 N.E.2d at 634. 
" /d. at 384 n.2, 360 N.E.2d at 634 n.2. 
•• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 621, 343 N.E.2d 859. 
" Lindsey, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 384 n.2, 360 N.E.2d at 634 n.12. 
17 Perry, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 625, 343 N.E.2d at 862, quoting 'Goodman v. Smith, 
340 Mass. 336, 338, 164 N.E.2d 130, 131 (1960). The facts of theca¥ indicated that the 
violation of the statute (a provision of a city building code) occurred 8fter the commence-
ment of the tenancy. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 626, 343 N.E.2d at 862. Thus the decision in 
Perry would appear not to have altered the common law rule. I 
" Mirick v. Galligan, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 465, 360 N.E.2d 1045. 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 167-68, 360 N .E.2d at 1046-47. Since t~e end of the Survey 
year, the issue reserved in Lindsey has been decided by the Courtl In King v. G & M 
Realty Corp., 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2372, 370 N.E.2d 413, the Court held that a landlord 
owes to his tenant the same duty of care that is owed to the tenant Is lawful visitors. /d. 
at 2375-76, 370 N.E.2d at 415. · 
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However, the extension of the duty of reasonable care to tenants 
would appear impelled by the reasoning of Lindsey and Mounsey. More-
over, such an extension would appear consistent with two recently en-
acted provisions of the General Laws which appear to have expanded 
the obligations of certain landlords to their tenants. Section 15E of 
chapter 186, enacted in 1972, provides: 
An owner of a building shall be precluded from raising as a defense 
in an action brought by a lessee, tenant or occupant of said build-
ing who has sustained an injury caused by a defect in a common 
area, that said defect existed at the time of the letting of the 
property, if said defect is at the time of the injury a violation of 
the building code of the city or town wherein the property is situ-
ated. Any waiver of this provision in any lease or other rental 
agreement shall be void and unenforceable. 20 
The language of this statute clearly indicates that a landlord may no 
longer rely on the common law defense that a defect causing an injury 
existed at the time the tenancy began, provided that defect is in viola-
tion of the local building code. However, section 15E "apparently cannot 
be invoked by guests of a lessee, tenant or occupant. "21 
In addition, section 19 of chapter 186 requires that a landlord or lessor 
of any real estate "except an owner-occupied two- or three-family dwell-
ing" exercise reasonable care to correct any unsafe condition on his 
premises which is not caused by the tenant or other lawful occupant or 
visitor.22 Although the landlord's duty to repair under this provision 
commences with regard to conditions in areas under the tenant's control 
only after the landlord receives written notice forwarded by registered 
or certified mail, no such notice need be given for unsafe conditions in 
areas not under the tenant's control.23 Section 19 does not limit the 
landlord's duty to repair only to those conditions arising after the ten-
ancy begins, but applies to preexisting unsafe conditions as well. Signifi-
cantly, failure to exercise reasonable care to correct these defects ex-
poses the landlord to liability in tort to the tenant or other lawful visitor 
who sustains injury as a result of the defect. 24 
Sections 15E and 19, though not referred to by the Court in Lindsey, 
signal a significant departure from the common law rule limiting the 
landlord's duty to his tenant, and thus appear compatible with the 
holding of Lindsey. In addition, sections 15E and 19 appear compatible 
28 G.L. c. 186, § 15E. 
•• D. SIMPSON & H. ALPERIN, SuMMARY or BAsic LAw § 1090 (1974). 
zz G.L. c. 186, § 19. 
zz Id. 
24 ld. 
4
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with the recognition of a duty of reasonable care running from landlords 
to tenants25 themselves as well as to tenants' guests. 
§ 5.3. Evidence-Libel-Instructing the Jury on lthe Meaning of 
Clear and Convincing Proof in Libel Cases. To prevail in most civil 
actions brought in Massachusetts courts, the party having the burden 
of persuasion must prove his case by a preponderance I of the evidence, 
that is the jury must believe that his contention "is mdre probably true 
than false."1 There are a few exceptions to the above standard, however, 
and some issues require "a degree of belief greater th~n 'a preponder-
ance' but less than 'beyond a reasonable doubt.' " 2 for example, to 
establish a gift causa mortis, the proof must be "convincing,"3 and the 
oral proof of the contents of a lost will must be "strong, positive and free 
from doubt."4 Such vague intermediate standards, horever, generally 
are not favored by the Massachusetts courts. 5 1 
Recent decisions by the United States Supreme Court and the Su-
preme Judicial Court have added another issue to th' relatively short 
list of those requiring an intermediate level of proof ~ying somewhere 
between "a preponderance of the evidence" and "beyond a reasonable 
doubt.'' As a matter of constitutional law, in a libel action brought by 
a public figure against a representative or member of lthe news media, 
the plaintiff must show by "clear and convincing proof" either that the 
defendant made statements knowing that they were false or in reckless 
disregard of the truth.• In Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 7 the 
Supreme Judicial Court attempted to give the phras~ "clear and con-
vincing proof' some content by stating that it referred to proof which is 
"strong, positive and free from doubt" and "full, clear~ and decisive."K 
During the Survey year, the Court was asked to consirer the adequacy 
of an instruction relating to this intermediate level of proof which had 
been given to the jury in a libel action brought by a public official. In 
" See note 19 supra. 
§ 5.3 1 W. LEACH AND P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSE'ITS EjVIDENCE 42 (1967). 
2 /d. at 43. Such a requirement ordinarily relates to findings and rujings made by a court 
rather than by a jury. Stone v. Essex County Newspapers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870 n.10, 
330 N.E.2d 161, 175 n.10 (1975). 
3 E.g., Foley v. Coan, 272 Mass. 207, 209-10, 172 N.E. 74, 75 (1~30). 
• Newell v. Homer, 120 Mass. 277, 280 (1876). I 
' See In re Mayberry, 295 Mass. 155, 167, 3 N.E.2d 248, 253 (1936). 
• Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 342 (1974); Stone v. Essex County Newspa-
pers, Inc., 367 Mass. 849, 870-71, 330 N.E.2d 161, 174-75 (1975). , 
1 367 Mass. 849, 330 N.E.2d 161 (1975). ! 
• ld. at 871, 330 N.E.2d at 175, quoting Coghlin v. White, 273 Mjass. 53, 55, 172 N.E. 
786, 786 (1930). See Kidder v. Greenman, 283 Mass. 601, 613, 187 N.E. 42, 48 (1933); 
Newell v. Homer, 120 Mass. 277, 280 (1876). 
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Callahan v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., Inc., • the judge instructed 
the jury that the phrase "clear and convincing evidence" refers to a 
standard of proof greater than "by a fair preponderance of evidence" but 
less than "beyond a reasonable doubt, " 10 and added: 
[T]he best I could suggest to you, I think, in trying to apply this 
burden of proof against the plaintiff is: ten of you are going to have 
to be satisfied that it is highly probable on evidence that is clear 
to you that [the defendant] personally seriously doubted the 
truth of some or all of the statements made in the broadcasts 
The word "convincing" after the word "clear" . .. suggests to 
me that there should not be too much room for argument among 
reasonable men and women under the standard of clear and con-
. • f II vmcmg proo .... 
The Court held that the words used by the trial judge to describe this 
"elusive intermediate level of burden of persuasion in terms which the 
jury could understand," were not improper. 12 While finding no error in 
the charge given by the trial judge, the Court suggested that a form of 
instruction be used "which defines 'clear and convincing proof,' not in 
terms of the quality of the evidence, but in terms of the state of mind 
of the trier of facts. " 13 As an example of the form of charge it had in 
mind, the Court offered the following instruction which had been sug-
gested by the Supreme Court of Connecticut: 
The burden of persuasion, therefore, in those cases requiring a 
showing of clear and convincing proof is sustained if evidence in-
duces in .the mind of the trier a reasonable belief that the facts 
asserted are highly probably true, that the probability that they 
are true or exist is substantially greater than the probability that 
they are false or do not exist. 14 
The opinion in Callahan indicates that the Court is willing to be 
somewhat flexible in allowing limited experimentation in this area by 
the lower courts. The decision does provide two examples of acceptable 
jury charges on the issue of clear and convincing proof but does not 
thereby exclude other formulations. Nevertheless, given the difficulty 
1 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. 1025, 363 N.E.2d 240. 
1o Id. at 1029, 363 N.E.2d at 242. · 
u Id. at 1030, 363 N.E.2d at 243 (emphasis supplied by the Court). 
11 Id. at 1031, 363 N.E.2d at 243. 
11 Id., citing McBaine, Burden of Proof: Degrees of Belief, 32 CALli'. L. REv. 242, 253-54 
(1944). 
1• 1977 MaBB. Adv. Sh. at 1032, 363 N .E.2d at 244, quoting Dacey v. Connecticut Bar 
Ass'n, 170 Conn. 520, 537, 368 A.2d 125, 134 (1976). 
6
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experienced by both appellate and trial courts in their efforts to concep-
tualize and give content to the standard, lower courts would be wise not 
to stray very far from the forms of instructions approved by the Court 
in this case.15 , 
§ 5.4. Recovery for Intentional Infliction of Ertional Harm 
without Resulting Physical Injury-Recovery for Loss of 
Consortium. The trend in modem tort law has been t allow recovery 
in a limited number of extreme cases for the intentio al infliction of 
severe emotional distress.• The Supreme Judicial Cou indicated its 
qualified approval of this trend in George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 2 where 
it held: "One who, without a privilege to do so, by extreme and outra-
geous conduct intentionally causes severe emotional distress to another, 
with bodily harm resulting from such distress, is subject to liability for 
such emotional distress and bodily harm even though he has committed 
no heretofore recognized common law tort. "3 Whether rlovery could be 
had in a case where intentionally inflicted emotional istress did not 
result in some physical injury was specifically reserved r future deter-
mination. • While this issue did arise subsequent to Geor e, 5 it remained 
undecided until the Survey year. ! 
In Agis v. Howard Johnson Co., • the Court considered the liability of 
a restaurant company and one of its managers for the mental anguish 
and emotional distress sustained by the plaintiff who was summarily 
rued by the defendant manager in the presence of other employees. 7 The 
trial court granted the defendant's motion to dismissj the complaint 
pursuant to Massachusetts Rule of Civil Procedure +2(b)(6) on the 
grounds that even if the allegations in the complaint 1 were true, the 
plaintiff had not alleged that she suffered physical inj~ries as a result 
of the defendant's acts and that, therefore, she had f4iled to state a 
claim upon which relief could be granted. 8 : 
On appeal, the Court reversed and held "that one who, by extreme 
and outrageous conduct and without privilege, causes severe emotional 
distress to another is subject to liability for such emotional distress even 
though no bodily harm may result. "• The Court acknowledged that this 
11 For a further discussion of Callahan, see Ortwein, Constitutional*aw, infra § 10.2. 
§ 5.4 1 Womack v. Eldridge, 215 Va. 338, 341 n.1, 210 S.E.2d 145, 1 7 n.1 (1974). See 
also Annot., 64 A.L.R.2nd 100, § 8 at 120 (1959); REsTATEMENT (SEco D) OF ToRTS § 46, 
comment b (1965). ! 
• 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 (1971). . 
3 I d. at 255, 268 N .E.2d at 921. 
• Id. 
1 See Baldassari v. Public Fin. Trust, 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3188, 337 N.E.2d 701. 
• 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2346, 355 N .E.2d 315. 
7 Id. at 2347, 355 N.E.2d at 316. 
• ld., 355 N.E.2d at 317. 
• ld. at 2351, 355 N.E.2d at 318. 
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extension of the result in George v. Jordan Marsh Co. may well give rise 
to problems in the area of proof. 10 In particular the Court recognized that 
mental anguish has been considered by some courts and commentators 
too "subtle and speculative" to be measured by known legal standards. 11 
Moreover, the Court took note of the argument that to allow recovery 
for such harm would open the doors of the courthouse to a flood of 
fictitious and trivial complaints.12 
Responding to these arguments, the Court noted that the possibility 
of frivilous or collusive suits exists in many areas of the law and that 
the responsibility for sifting the valid from the invalid properly rests 
with trial judge and jury.13 Justice Quirico, writing for the Court, did 
concede, however, that while he did not consider the difficulties of proof 
to be insurmountable, the door to recovery in these cases should only 
be opened "narrowly and with due caution."•• 
Thus, the Court determined that in order to recover under an 
"emotional distress" theory the plaintiff must establish: 
(1) that the actor intended to inflict emotional distress or that he 
knew or should have known that emotional distress was the likely 
result of his conduct ... ; (2) that the conduct was "extreme and 
outrageous," and was "beyond all possible bounds of decency" and 
was "utterly intolerable in a civilized community" ... ; (3) that 
the actions of the defendant were the cause of the plaintiff's dis-
tress ... ; (4) that the emotional distress sustained by the plain-
tiff was "severe" and of a nature "that no reasonable man could 
be expected to endure it."15 
While all four of these elements are important, it would appear that 
the key to recovery in these cases is the requirement that the plaintiff's 
distress be "severe."•• A plaintiff proving only that the defendant's ac-
" Id. at 2349, 355 N.E.2d at 317-18. 
11 /d., 355 N.E.2d at 318. , 
•z Id., citing Hamed v. E-Z Finance Co., 151 Tex. 641, 649, 254 S.W.2d 81, 86 (1953); 
Bartow v. Smith, 149 Ohio St. 301, 310-11, 78 N.E.2d 735, 739-40 (1948); Gardner v. 
Cumberland Tel. Co., 207 Ky. 249, 254, 268 S.W. 1108, 1110 (1925); W. PROSSER, LAw OF 
TORTS § 12, at 59-60 (4th ed. 1971). 
13 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2350, 355 N.E.2d at 318, citing Sorensen v. Sorensen, 1975 
Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907 (child may recover from parent for injuries sustained 
in automobile accident) and George v. Jordan Marsh Co., 359 Mass. 244, 268 N.E.2d 915 
(1971). 
14 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2351, 355 N.E.2d at 318, citing Barnett v. Collection Serv. 
Co., 214 Iowa 1303, 242 N.W. 25 (1932). 
" 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2351, 355 N.E.2d at 318-19 (citations omitted). 
11 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 46, Comment j (1965) provides in part: 
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental suffering, mental 
anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It includes all highly unpleasant 
mental reactions, such as fright, horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, 
8
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I 
tions produced simple and brief annoyance or some s1fmilar mild emo-
tional upset, will not meet the burden imposed by t is requirement. 
"Complete emotional tranquility is seldom attainable i this world, and 
some degree of transient and trivial emotional distres is a part of the 
price of living among people."17 • 
The problem remains, however, that the range of hu~an emotions is 
broad and a trier of fact faced with evidence of emol!~nal distress is 
likely to have some difficulty in deciding if and when the threshold of 
severity entitling the plaintiff to recover has been eros ed. The Court's 
observation that such distress must be of the type whi h no reasonable 
person could endure may offer some guidance, but t e jury's task of 
measuring the extent of the plaintiffs emotional inj ry to determine 
whether it qualifies as "severe" will, nevertheless, be very difficult. 
The use of a "reasonable man" standard to measur the severity of 
emotional harm appears consistent with the approaclof the Restate-
ment.•• Thus, the Restatement authors note for examp e, that "the law 
intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe hat no reasona-
ble man could be expected to endure it."•• In light oft e Court's appar-
ent agreement with the Restatement's objective stand~rd, the question 
arises of whether the Court will agree with the Restat~ment in another 
significant respect. In particular the Restatement authors have indi-
cated that the issue of whether a reasonable man cou* endure certain 
level of pain may not, in all cases, be determinative of liability. Thus, 
the authors have stated that a plaintiff whose distress i~ in fact exagger-
ated or unreasonable may still recover if his injury "res\(llts from a pecu-
liar susceptibility to such distress of which the actor h s knowledge. " 211 
It would appear then, that under the Restatement view, one may recover 
for mental distress which a reasonable person could ndure provided 
that the plaintiff shows that his own inability to endu e was the result 
of some personal sensitivity of which the defendant had knowledge. The 
Court's reliance on the Restatement in both Jordan M rsh Co. 21 and in 
Agis, 22 may indicate that a peculiarly vulnerable plain iff may be able 
to recover upon showing the actor's knowledge of his ensitivity. 
It should also be noted that the decision in Agis dof.s not affect the 
law in Massachusetts as it relates to recovery for neg~igently inflicted 
emotional distress unaccompanied by physical injury 1 At present, no 
anger, chagrin, disappointment, worry and nausea. It is only w ere it is extreme 
that the liability arises. 
17 /d. 
II /d. 
11 /d., Comments j and f. 
• ld. at§ 46. 
21 359 Mass. at 253-55, 268 N.E.2d at 919-21. 
22 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2351, 355 N.E.2d at 318-19. 
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recovery may be had for such harm.23 The continued validity of this rule 
was discussed but not decided in Jordan Marsh Co. 24 
The Court in Agis also held that either spouse may maintain an action 
for loss of consortium "where the acts complained of are intentional, and 
where the injuries to the spouse are emotional rather than physical."25 
The Court recognized other areas where a claim for loss of consortium 
has been predicated upon an intentional invasion of the marriage rela-
tionship such as alienation of affection or adultery. Consequently, the 
Court could find no reason to deny a claim based upon "intentional 
infliction of severe emotional distress."26 
§ 5.5. Negligence of Parking Garage Operator. The established 
rule in Massachusetts is that a possessor of lands who holds it open to 
the public for business purposes owes "a duty to a paying patron to use 
reasonable care to prevent injury to him by third persons whether their 
acts were accidental, negligent, or intentional."• This principle was af-
firmed by the Court of Appeals during the Survey year in Parslow v. 
Pilgrim Parking, Inc. 2 The plaintiff in Parslow had parked her automo-
bile in the defendant's garage. When she returned to the car a short time 
later she was accosted by a stranger who forced her to leave the garage 
and then raped her.3 The plaintiff testified that she had noticed the 
assailant loitering in the garage when she parked her car, twenty-five 
minutes prior to the assault.' The basis of the complaint was that the 
defendant had been negligent in not taking reasonable precautions to 
prevent the attack in question. The jury returned a verdict for the plain-
tiff. 
On appeal, the court noted that, in light of the plaintiffs testimony, 
the defendant's security guards had "sufficient opportunity to observe 
the plaintiffs assailant" and held that the trial judge "did not err in 
permitting the jury to determine whether the owner of the garage took 
reasonable steps to protect its patrons from injury caused by the foresee-
able acts of third persons, even if those acts were intentional. "6 
23 Spade v. Lynn & B. R. Co., 168 Mass. 285, 290, 47 N.E. 88, 89 (1897); D. SIMPSON & 
H. ALPERIN, SUMMARY OF BASIC LAW § 1852 (1974). 
" 359 Mass. at 255, 268 N.E.2d at 921. 
,. 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2353, 355 N.E.2d at 320. 
" Id. at 2353, 355 N.E.2d at 319, citing Diaz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 364 Mass. 152, 158-60, 
302 N.E.2d 555, 558-60 (1973). 
§ 5.5. ' Carey v. New Yorker of Worcester, Inc., 355 Mass. 450, 452, 245 N.E.2d 420, 
422 (1969) and cases cited therein. See REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF ToRTS § 344 (1965). 
2 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 549, 362 N.E.2d 933. 
3 Id., 362 N.E.2d at 934. 
'Id. 
'Id. 
'Id. 
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The significance of this case lies not in its reiterati~n of the well-
settled principle concerning the duty an owner of bu~iness premises 
owes to paying customers, but in the application of that rule to the facts 
presented. Most of the cases in which an operator of a business has been 
held liable for failing to take reasonable steps to prevfnt intentional 
harm to a patron by a third person have arisen in c'nnection with 
injuries sustained in establishments where liquor is served. In such 
cases, the evidence usually demonstrates quite clearly that the assailant 
was intoxicated, boisterous, or aggressive and that the defendant or his 
employees knew of the assailant's condition before th~ injury to the 
plaintiff occurred. 7 ! 
Similarly, operators of a ship have been held liable f~r harm caused 
to a passenger by persons who were intoxicated and who had been ob-
served fighting with other passengers just prior to their assault on the 
plaintiff.8 In Rawson v. Massachusetts Operating Co., In~., • the plaintiff 
recovered damages from the owner of a movie theater fori an intentional 
injury caused by another patron who, along with several other persons, 
had been raising a commotion in the theater for more than an hour and 
a half prior to the incident giving rise to the suit. 10 On these facts, the 
Court held that: 
[t]he jury could find that the defendant was remiss. i • in failing 
to discover and stop the disorder; that the defendant should have 
known that if it did not take such action, it was to be reasonably 
anticipated that patrons might undertake to supply the omission; 
and that if that happened, the authors of the rowd~ism might 
resent such unofficial interference . . . and might evep commit a 
cowardly assault in the dark upon a remonstrating patron.11 
These cases indicate the willingness of the Massachusetts courts to 
impose liability on the operators of businesses for the forseeable harm 
to their patrons intentionally caused by other individual~ on the defen-
dant's premises. In such instances, the assailant's obvi~us and highly 
disruptive or aggressive behavior flashed a warning to the !business oper-
ator or his employees that harm to someone on the premises was almost 
certain if he did not take immediate steps to quell the disturbance. In 
! 
7 See, e.g., Carey, 355 Mass. 450, 451, 245 N.E.2d 420, 421-22 (196~); Kane v. Fields 
Comer Grille, Inc., 341 Mass. 640, 641, 171 N.E.2d 287, 289 (1961); !Greco v. Sumner 
Tavern, Inc., 333 Mass. 144, 144-45, 128 N.E.2d 788,788-89 (1955); McFadden v. Bancroft 
Hotel Corp., 313 Mass. 56, 58-59, 46 N.E.2d 573, 574 (1943). 
8 Quigley v. Wilson Line of Massachusetts, Inc., 338 Mass. 125, 127-:18, 154 N.E.2d 77, 
79 (1958), I 
' 328 Mass. 558, 105 N.E.2d 220 (1952). 
11 /d. at 560, 105 N .E.2d at 220-21. 
11 /d., 105 N.E.2d at 221. 
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Parslow, however, the assailant was not unruly and caused no commo-
tion sufficient to announce to the defendant his presence and potential 
for harm. By imposing liability under these circumstances, the court has 
indicated that the obligation of those holding their property open to the 
public for business purposes is not only one of taking reasonable steps 
to control openly aggressive individuals whose actions pose an obvious 
threat to the safety of third persons rightfully on the premises. Rather, 
that obligation encompasses an affirmative duty to exercise reasonable 
care to discover the less vociferous potential wrongdoer and prevent his 
causing harm to such third parties. 
§ 5.6. Negligence-Foreseeability of Harm. In Tibbetts v. Ford 
Motor Co., 1 the Appeals Court held that in order to establish a defen-
dant manufacturer's negligence, the evidence must show not only that 
the defendant manufactured an imperfect product which caused injury 
to the plaintiff, but also that the manufacturer could have reasonably 
anticipated that injury would result from the use of its product. 2 
The plaintiff in Tibbetts suffered two deep lacerations in his hand 
when he unsuccessfully tried to remove one of the wheel covers from his 
car by sliding his bare fingers through one of the decorative slots on the 
cover and pulling against it with considerable force. 3 There were burrs 
on the inside edge of the slots, and the plaintiff's injuries were caused 
by the pressue he exerted against the edge while trying to remove the 
cover.4 
The court examined the wheel covers and found that the burrs were 
obvious to the touch, and "that one would have to pull one's hand 
against the inner edge of any of the slots with considerable force and 
without a glove or other protection in order to break the skin."5 It con-
cluded that "the burr-covered decorative slot must be classed with a 
great many other common fixtures, projections, surfaces, comers, and 
edges found in vehicles and elsewhere as a result of which significant 
injuries are possible but are not reasonably to be anticipated."• Thus, 
it followed that the defendant was not negligent in failing to discover 
and remove the burrs. 
The court did indicate, however, that a different result might have 
been justified if the case had involved "sharp burrs on a surface such 
as a door handle ... that is intended to be manipulated," or "a wheel 
cover slot with hidden, sharp edges that could seriously injure someone 
merely inserting his hand, a use not intended for the slots . . . but 
§ 5.6. 1 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1285, 358 N.E.2d 460. 
2 ld. at 1290-91, 358 N.E.2d at 462. 
3 Id. at 1286, 358 N.E.2d at 460. 
• ld. at 1286-87, 358 N.E.2d at 460-61. 
• ld. at 1289-90, 358 N.E.2d at 462. 
• ld. at 1290, 358 N.E.2d at 462. 
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. the manufacturer should expect in the course of normal 
§ 5.7. Negligence-Prima Facie Case-Automobile Collisions. 
The general rule in actions arising out of a collision qf automobiles at 
an intersection is that the issue of the respective drivel'ls' negligence is a 
question of fact to be determined by the jury.1 This rule "has been 
applied even in cases where the circumstances have impelled the Su-
preme Judicial Court to label the cases as 'close,' in determining that 
directed verdicts should not have been ordered. " 2 
There have been rare cases, however, in which the evidence of the 
parties' conduct has been so ·incomplete that a jury would not be war-
ranted in finding that the defendant had been negligent and which, 
therefore, require that a verdict be directed for the defendant. 3 During 
the Survey year, the Appeals Court considered one M the rare cases 
requiring such action by the trial court. 
In Hunter v. State Street Garage Corp. 4 the plaintiff '!Vas injured when 
the car in which she was a passenger was involved in a collision with a 
car operated by the defendant's employee. The accide•t occurred at an 
intersection, and the car in which the plaintiff was riding came to rest 
after striking a post which supported an elevated railway.5 The plaintiff 
argued that the car driven by the defendant's employee was travelling 
at an improperly high rate of speed and that it struck the car in which 
she was riding, propelling it into the post. 8 The plaintiff further con-
tended that as a result of this impact, the plaintiff was thrown into the 
windshield and sustained serious injuries.7 
The only evidence presented by the plaintiff relating to the speed of 
7 ld. at 1290, 358 N.E.2d at 462. The court also seemed to indicdte that because the · 
wheel cover was neither inherently dangerous nor uncommon and apt to confuse the user, 
the defendant had no duty to warn of the harm which might result from the improper use 
of the product. ld. at 1288-89, 358 N.E.2d at 461-62. While this may be too narrow a view 
of the duty to warn, the court's comments on this issue must be kept in perspective. The 
question before the court was whether the defendant had been negligent in failing to 
discover and eliminate certain flaws in its product. The brief discussion of the duty to 
warn must, therefore, be considered dictum. In addition, it is not at all clear from the 
language it used that the court intended to set forth a hard and fast rule excluding such 
a duty in cases which do not involve inherently dangerous or uncommon and confusing 
products. 
§ 5.7. 1 E. MARTIN & E. HENNESSEY, AUTOMOBILE LAw & PRACTICE § 582 (1967). 
2 ld. 
3 ld., citing Buckley v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 323 Mass. '448, 82 N.E.2d 599 
(1948). 
4 1976 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 1024, 354 N.E.2d 894. 
1 ld. at 1025-26, 354 N.E.2d at 894-95. 
• ld. at 1027, 354 N.E.2d at 895. 
7 ld. 
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either vehicle was her own testimony that the car in which she was a 
passenger "came to a slow drive" as it approached the intersection 
·where it was struck in the rear quarter panel on the passenger side by 
the other vehicle. 8 She offered no evidence as to the speed of the other 
car; the angle at which the cars impacted; the order in which the two 
cars entered the intersection; or the presence or absence of traffic lights 
or stop signs at the intersection.• There was nothing to indicate negli-
gence on the part of the defendant's employee in the testimony of other 
eyewitnesses to the accident. 10 
In light of the scant evidence presented by the plaintiff, the court held 
that the trial judge had erred in refusing to grant the defendant's motion 
for a directed verdict and stated: "In no case that we have found apply-
ing the general rule concerning intersection collisions has the evidence 
for the plaintiff been so devoid of detail as the evidence in this case; in 
none has an inference of the defendant'~ negligence been left so wholly 
to conjecture." 11 
§ 5.8. Choice of Law-Abandonment of Lex Loci Delictus 
Rule-Abolition of Interspousal Immunity-Retroactivity. 
A. Choice of Law. Choice of law doctrine in the area of torts has 
recently undergone significant change in many jurisdictions! The tradi-
tional conflicts rule, which requires that the forum apply the substan-
tive law of the place where the tort occurred, 2 has been severely criti-
cized by both the judiciary and legal commentators.3 Numerous and 
divergent theories designed to replace the old rule in multi-state tort 
cases have been proposed. Examples are the Restatement's "most sig-
8 Id. at 1025-26, 354 N.E.2d at 894-95. 
• ld. at 1028-29, 354 N.E.2d at 895-96. 
11 Id. at 1026 & n.2, 354 N.E.2d at 895 & n.2. 
11 ld. at 1029, 354 N.E.2d at 896. Cf. Wrenn v. Domar, 1977 Mass. App. Ct. Adv. Sh. 
151, 151, 359 N.E.2d 658, 659 (applying the "'rule that ordinarily where a collision 
occurs between travelers on a highway the issue as to negligence is for the Uury],'" 
quoting Nash v. Heald, 306 Mass. 518, 520, 29 N.E.2d 7, 9 (1940)). 
§ 5.8. 1 See, e.g., Note, After Hurtado and Bernhard: Interest Analysis and the Search 
for a Consistent Theory for Choice of Law Cases, 29 STAN. L. REv. 127, 127 n. 5 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as Note]. 
2 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CoNFLICT OF LAws § 158 (1971). 
3 Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.Y.2d 473, 478 & nn. 3, 4, & 5, 191 N.E.2d 279, 281 & nn. 3, 
4, & 5, 240 N.Y.S.2d 743, 746-47 & nn. 3, 4, & 5 (1963); Clark v. Clark, 107 N.H. 351, 
352, 222 A.2d 205, 207 (1966); CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAw PRoCESs 65-67 (1965); B. CURRIE, 
SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 46-58 (1963) [hereinafter cited as CURRIE]; 
Weintraub, A Method for Solving Conflict Problems-Torts, 48 CoRNELL L. Q. 215, 216 
(1963); Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 641 (1968). Profes-
sor Rosenberg's article begins: "For a generation and more, conflicts pundits have been 
gushing rivers of ink and oceans of indignation over the sorry state to which classical 
c:hoice-of-law ideology has brought the world almost single-handedly." ld. 
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nificant relationship" test, • Currie's "governmental interest" analysis5 
and Leflar's "choice influencing" considerations.• Whi~e there has been 
disagreement as to the content of a new conflicts rulel all of the newer 
approaches seem to agree that "there is a duty imposed on the forum 
court to undertake an analytical approach to the facts presented in a 
multi-state tort action to determine what law should govern the sub-
stantive rights of the parties. "7 • 
Despite the general nationwide trend against the traditional rule, the 
courts in Massachusetts continued to apply the strict lex loci delictus 
rule. In Pevoski v. Pevoski, 8 however, the Supreme Judicial Court de-
parted from the traditional rule and adopted a conflicts analysis which 
requires application of the law of the state with the "s~rongest interest" 
in the issue in question.' , 
The plaintiff in Pevoski, a domiciliary of Massachusetts, sued her 
husband for injuries sustained in a three-car collision in New York. She 
had been a passenger in the automobile operated by her husband at the 
time of the accident.•• All three of the vehicles involv~d were operated 
by Massachusetts residents and the Pevoski car was registered, insured 
and garaged in Massachusetts. 11 The trial court granted the defendant's 
motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the defendant was 
entitled to interspousal immunity .12 
On appeal, the Court first considered the plaintiff~ contention that 
the law of New York, which does not recognize interspousal immunity, 
should control. 11 The Court resolved this choice of law ~roblem by focus-
ing on the "interests" of each state in the particular issue presented. 14 
Since the litigation would affect only Massachusetts domiciliaries and 
a Massachusetts insurer, the Court found that though the accident oc-
curred in New York, the state had "no legitimate inter~st" in regulating 
the interspousal relationships of the parties and held' that Massachu-
setts law should govern on this issue.l6 
The Court, while seemingly adopting an "interest analysis" approach, 
• REsTATEMENT (SECOND) or CONII'IJCT or LAws § 145 (1971). 
• CURRJE, supra note 3, at 177-187; W. RusE & M. RosENBERG, CoNFLICT or LAws: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 523 (1971). 
• R. LEii'LAR, AMERICAN CoNII'IJCTS LAw § 101 et seq. (1968). 
' Annot., 29 A.L.R. 3d 602, 623 (1970). 
1 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 2624, 358 N.E.2d 416. 
1 Id. at 2626-27, 358 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
1o I d. at 2624, 358 N .E.2d at 417. 
II Id. 
II Jd. 
II Jd. 
14 ld. at 2626, 358 N.E.2d at 417 citing Babcock v. Jackson, 12 N.)".2d 473, 191 ~.E.2d 
279, 240 N.Y.S. 2d 743 (1963). . 
11 ld. at 2626-27, 358 N.E.2d at 417-18. 
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was unwilling to depart completely from the traditional lex loci rule. 
The Court was careful to point out that the traditional rule will 
"continue to provide a rational and just procedure for selecting the law 
governing the vast majority of issues in multi-state tort suits."18 
Unfortunately, that portion of the Court's opinion concerning the 
choice of law issue is very brief. It contains very little discussion of the 
traditional rule, its rationale, or the reasons for its replacement. In 
addition, the Court does not indicate its own view on the content of the 
new rule or method. For example, no reference is made therein to the 
types of factors which should be considered in determining a jurisdic-
tion's interest in a specific issue, and, as a result, no guidance is pro-
vided on the question of how various interests should be identified, 
evaluated and compared.17 As a result, the net effect of the Pevoski case 
on choice of law questions is uncertain. It is clear, for example, that in 
multi-state automobile torts, the state where the accident occurred will 
almost always have the strongest interest in prescribing the rules gov-
erning any driver's conduct on its roads and, therefore, the standards 
of negligence will generally be furnished by that state.l8 Therefore, one 
may view Pevoski as an abandonment of the traditional lex loci ap-
proach in favor of the more flexible interest analysis approach with the 
understanding that the result under the new approach will often be the 
same as under the traditional rule. 
The Court did, however, rely heavily on the leading New York case, 
Babcock v. Jackson, a decision which is generally thought to be in 
accord with the Restatement's "dominant contacts" or "most signifi-
cant relationship approach."1' The authors of the Restatement have set 
forth a list of principles and contacts to be considered by courts in 
determining which jurisdiction's law should apply in a multi-state tort 
action; for example: the need of the interstate and international sys-
tems, the relevant policies of the forum, the place where the injury 
occurred, and the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred. 211 
11 Id. at 2625, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
17 It has been suggested that simply identifying the interests underlying various state 
rules is in itself an extremely difficult, if not impossible, task. Reese & Rosenberg note 
that: 
[e]ven simple rules such as those encountered in the guest-host automobile field 
or limiting recoveries for wrongful death do not stand alone. They are composites 
of thrusts and counterthrusts of diverse policies. It will be a rare case in which a 
state can correctly be said to have a singular and unequivocal "interest" in the 
application of a particular rule to a multi-state fact situation. 
REEsE & RosENBERG, CoNFLICT oF LAws: CASES AND MATERIALS 571 (1971). 
11 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2625, 358 N .E.2d at 417. 
11 Leflar, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 637 (1968) [hereinafter 
cited as Leflar]. 
• RESTATEMENT (SECOND) oF CoNFLICT oF LAws §§ 6, 145 (1971). 
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Thus, the Restatement will be helpful as a guide to the types of issues 
the courts should consider in these cases, but it, too, f~ils to indicate 
the relative importance of these various principles andj contacts. 
In Pevoski, the Court had little difficulty in finding that New York 
had no interest at all in providing the law on the question of interspousal 
immunity because none of the parties involved were residents of that 
state.21 It was not necessary, then, for the Court to actual~y evaluate and 
compare the interests of each jurisdiction. A differen~ and far more 
difficult question will be presented in future cases if, after considering 
all of the facts, the Court finds that each jurisdiction involved has a 
legitimate interest in the same issue.22 
Currie argues that if, after careful consideration, a qourt finds that 
each state has a valid governmental interest in a given i~sue, the forum 
should not attempt to weigh these interests to determine which was 
stronger, but instead should apply its own law.23 The authors of the 
Restatement appear to reject Currie's forum-favoring approach and 
present a method requiring the evaluation of all relevant principles and 
contacts in an effort to determine which jurisdiction has the most signif-
icant relationship to the issue in question. 24 
At this point, it may be wise to remember that choice of law theory 
"is still in its growing period. The effort of every scholar, judicial or 
academic, who labors in the field is to develop some approach that will 
take account of and give effect to all the sensible polic~es and reasons 
that courts may legitimately consider when they make choice of law 
decisions."25 The Court's decision in Pevoski v. Pevoski represents only 
the beginning, not the end, of its search for such an approach.26 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2626, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
22 The response of the California Supreme Court to this problem is described in Note, 
supra note 1, at 143-156. The author of the article writes: 
In Bernhard v. Ha"ah's Club, the California Supreme Court finally found a true 
conflict, that is, a case in which more than one state was found to have an interest 
in having its rule applied to the facts of the case. The court adop~ed a method of 
resolving true-conflicts cases that, as applied, would justify a court's ad hoc choice 
of law of any interested state. 
ld. at 143. (footnotes omitted) (emphasis in the original). 
zs On this point, Currie wrote: 
Fourth, where several states have different policies, and also legitimate interests 
in the application of their policies, a court is in no position to "weigh" the compet-
ing interests or evaluate their relative merits and choose between them accordingly 
. . . . Not even a very ponderous Brandeis brief could marshal the tfelevant consid-
erations in choosing, for example, between the interest of the state 'of employment 
and that of injury in matters concerning workmen's compensation. 
CURRIE, supra note 3, at 181-82 (footnote omitted). 
24 REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 & comments !thereto. 
21 Leflar, supra note 19, at 641. ; 
21 In Saharceski v. Marcure, 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1890, 336 N.E.2d ~245, a post-Survey 
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B. Retroactivity of Lewis v. Lewis. Once the Court decided the con-
flicts issue in Pevoski in favor of applying the law of the Commonwealth, 
the Court had to decide if the claim was barred by the doctrine of 
interspousal immunity. On this issue the Court held that the result in 
Lewis v. Lewis, 27 abolishing interspousal immunity in automobile acci-
dent cases, applies retroactively to claims arising prior to the date of 
that decision which have not been disposed of by settlement or judg-
ment or by the running of the statute of limitations.28 
The starting point for the Court's analysis on the retroactivity issue 
was the decision in Lewis abolishing the common law rule of inter-
spousal immunity. In Lewis the Court had reasoned that the abrogation 
of interspousal immunity was "consistent with the general principle 
that if there is tortious injury there should be recovery, and only strong 
arguments of public policy should justify a judicially created immunity 
for tortfeasors and bar recovery for injured victims. " 211 The Court in 
Pevoski found the reasoning of Lewis "equally compelling in the present 
action."30 In what would seem to be additional support for the decision 
to apply Lewis retroactively, the Court took note of the widespread 
existence of insurance coverage for interspousal claims. 31 From this the 
Court concluded that there should be little impact on insureds or insur-
ers.32 
Justice Quirico concurred in the result in Pevoski, and discussed in 
detail the relationship between interspousal immunity and insurance. 
He expressed his view that the question of insurance coverage should be 
considered irrelevant to the issue ofliability not only in interspousal tort 
actions arising out of automobile accidents but also in such tort actions 
between parents and their children.33 The elimination of insurance cov-
erage as a liability-limiting factor in both types of cases is necessary, in 
his opinion, both to permit the courts to treat the "important subject 
of familial liability on its own merits"34 and to prevent future cases in 
which the courts are "faced with requests to abrogate the doctrine of 
governmental immunity or the remaining vestiges of the doctrine of 
year case, the Supreme Judicial Court again applied an interests analysis approach in 
deciding that the law of the commonwealth rather than the law of the state where the 
injury occurred should be applied to determine liability between fellow workers where 
both were employed in Massachusetts. Id. at 1897-99, 366 N.E.2d at 1248-49. 
27 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. 1764, 351 N.E.2d 526. 
21 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
zt 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1779, 351 N.E.2d at 532. 
so 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2628, 358 N.E.2d at 418. 
31 Id . 
., Id. 
33 Id. at 2630, 358 N.E.2d at 419 (Quirico, J., concurring). 
34 Id. (Quirico, J., concurring). 
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charitable immunity on the claimed basis of the existence of insurance 
coverage in each particular case."35 
As noted above, a majority of the Court in Sorens~n v. Sorensen36 
abrogated the doctrine of parental immunity in automobile tort cases, 
but only "to the extent of the parent's automobile li~bility insurance 
coverage."37 While the Court has refused to limit liabilit~ in interspousal 
tort cases in this manner,38 it remains to be seen in future cases whether 
a majority of the Court will adopt Justice Quirico's position and 
"disavow that part of the Sorensen holding which ma~es the existence 
of such insurance coverage a condition precedent to parental liability 
and limits recovery to the amount of such coverage."39 
It is interesting to note that the decision to apply Ler»is retroactively 
made it unnecessary for the Court to even address the choice of law issue 
in the Pevoski case. The accident occurred in New York. New York does 
not recognize the doctrine of interspousal immunity in tort cases and, 
therefore, if New York law had been applied, the plaitttiff would have 
been permitted to maintain this action against her husband. 40 Similarly, 
since the Court in Pevoski held that Lewis v. Lewis applied retroac-
tively, the doctrine of interspousal immunity did not apply under Mas-
sachusetts law to bar Mrs. Pevoski's claim. There was, therefore, no real 
conflict between the laws of New York and Massachusetts in this case, 
and the Court need not have discussed the choice of law issue at all. 
That the Court nevertheless considered that issue seemed to indicate 
that the Court viewed the abrogation of the lex loci rule as a matter 
deserving its immediate attention. 
§ 5.9. Informed Consent. In the wake of a nationwide increase in 
the number of medical malpractice suits, the doctripe of "informed 
consent" has, in recent years, received considerable attention from both 
the courts and legal commentators.' The issue generally arises where the 
plaintiff alleges that the defendant physician failed t9 adequately in-
form him of the risks of or alternatives to a medical procedure which the 
defendant performed on the plaintiff and which resulted in injury to 
him. The gravamen ofthe complaint is that the plaintiff would not have 
submitted to the procedure if he had known of the risks involved. 
The doctrine of informed consent as originally conceived was based 
11 /d. (Quirico, J., concurring). 
11 1975 Mass. Adv. Sh. 3662, 339 N.E.2d 907. 
17 /d. at 3665, 339 N.E.2d at 909. 
11 Lewis, 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 1780 & n.4, 351 N.E.2d at 532-33 & n.4. 
31 1976 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 2630, 358 N.E.2d at 419. (Quirico, J., boncurring). 
•• Id. at 2625, 358 N.E.2d at 417. 
§ 5.9. 1 See, e.g., 2 D. LoutsELL & H. WILIJAMS, MEDICAL MALPRAiCTJCE § 22.08 (1976) 
[hereinafter cited as LoutsELL & WILIJAMs). ' 
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upon a battery theory whereby it was reasoned that the failure to inform 
vitiated the consent to the procedure.2 Gradually, however, courts 
moved away from a battery theory and towards a negligence theory for 
informed consent actions.3 The doctor's negligence in such an action lies 
in his failure to adequately inform the patient of the risks attendant 
upon the proposed procedure. 4 While recovery for lack of informed con-
sent based on negligence rather than on battery may be more in line 
with the realities of the doctor-patient relationship, this approach is not 
problem free either. One problem in this area is determining the stan-
dard of care to which a doctor should be held in disclosing risks to his 
patients.5 
Despite the persistence of difficulties, however, the doctrine has been 
receiving increasing recognition.• The courts in Massachusetts, however, 
have yet to take a "measured position on 'informed consent,' and 
[have] resist[ed] all temptation to do so." This resistance was evident 
in Schroeder v. Lawrence, 7 decided during the Survey year. 
In Schroeder, the plaintiff sought to recover damages for injury to one 
of her vocal cords, allegedly resulting from an operation performed by 
the defendant during which he removed a tumor from her thyroid 
gland. 8 The plaintiff charged the defendant with negligence "in recom-
mending an operation while failing to inform [her] of the risks of the 
surgery or of possible alternative treatments. "1 
A motion for summary judgment was filed by the plaintiff. She as-
serted in her affidavit that the defendant had not warned her of the risks 
involved in the surgery and if she had been so warned, she "would not 
have then, ... consented to the operative procedure."10 An otolaryngo-
logist affied that he had examined the plaintiff since the operation and 
found that her left vocal cord was injured; "in his opinion, the condition 
was permanent and resulted from the operation [in issue]."11 A general 
surgeon also submitted an affidavit stating that in his opinion, any 
operation on the thyroid gland involved an "inherent and well known 
risk" of the type of injury sustained by the plaintiff. 12 
' Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malpractice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. 1396, 1399 & 
n.18 (1967). 
3 Comment, New Trends in Informed Consent?, 54 NEB. L. REv. 66, 69-72 (1975). 
'Id. at 70. 
' Comment, Informed Consent in Medical Malprar:tice, 55 CALIF. L. REv. at 1399-1406 
(1967). 
1 LoUISELL & WILLIAMS, supra note 1 (Cum. Supp. 1977), at 95-109. 
7 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 286, 290, 359 N.E.2d 1301, 1303 (citations omitted). 
8 Id. at 286-87, 359 N.E.2d at 1301-02. 
• I d. at 287, 359 N .E.2d at 1302. 
"Id. 
II Id. 
'' I d. at 288, 359 N .E.2d at 1302. 
20
Annual Survey of Massachusetts Law, Vol. 1977 [2012], Art. 8
http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/asml/vol1977/iss1/8
96 1977 ANNUAL SURVEY OF MASSACHUSETI'S LAW §5.9 
In his affidavit, the defendant stated that his "commo~ practice" was 
to discuss surgical risks with his patients but he had no ~ecord of such 
a discussion with the plaintiff.18 He also stated that, while! in his opinion, 
the operation in question involved some risk of injury to the vocal cord, 
the risk was not high and that in the more than 150 s¥ch operations 
performed by him, no injury of this type had resulted. 14 T~e court denied 
the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment; and whe'- the case was 
called for trial, the plaintiff "invited the entry of jud~ment for the 
defendant in order ... to achieve the finality neededf for appellate 
review.•• 
On appeal, the Court avoided taking a firm position op the status of 
"informed consent" as a theory of recovery in this jurisdiption by ruling 
that: 
[N]o more than a shallow immersion in the doctrine is needed to 
dispose of the summary judgment issue against tlie plaintiff. 
Whatever the precise definition or scope of the surge~n's duty to 
provide information to the patient, the patient would/be required 
to show, in order to connect any breach of duty to tjhe ultimate 
injury, that, had the proper information been provide~, he or she 
would have refused the operation; indeed one can we~l argue that 
the patient must go further and establish that in alllthe circum-
stances a reasonable person would have refused it . . . . The latter 
proposition the plaintiff failed altogether to establish ip her papers 
on the motion; as to the former, she likewise failed, si~ce her bare 
assertion that she would have declined the operation 4id not carry 
its own passport of convincingness, despite the si~cerity with 
which she might put it forward long after the event. I• 
The Court also observed that on any view of the doctrine, "a plain-
tiff must show that the undisclosed risk was material, a~d that it ma-
terialized .... " 17 Here, experts disagreed on the nature of the risk. The 
factual dispute was fatal to the plaintiff's motion for summary 
judgment. 
The opinion in Schroeder v. Lawrence does very little to remove the 
uncertainty concerning the availability of the doctrine ot informed con-
sent as a theory of liability in the Commonwealth. From this general 
uncertainty stem several specific unanswered questions, For example, 
what standard of disclosure should be imposed on a phy~ician? Will the 
plaintiff be required to show that he would not have c~nsented to the 
II Id. 
14 Id. 
11 ld. at 289, 359 N.E.2d at 1302. 
11 Id. at 290, 359 N.E.2d at 1303 (citations omitted). 
17 I d. at 291, 359 N .E.2d at 1303. 
i 
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procedure if adequate warning had been given or must he prove that no 
reasonable person would have consented? 
The Court was clear on one issue, however: a case for a summary 
judgment on the informed consent theory "can be made out only in an 
exceptional situation."18 Answers to the other questions must await fu-
ture decisions in this area. 
§ 5.10. Evidence-Admissibility of Subsequently Issued Owner's 
Manual-Admissibility of Computer Simulation of Automobile 
Accident. The courts in Massachusetts and other jurisdictions have 
generally held that evidence of remedial safety measures taken by the 
defendant after injury to the plaintiff are inadmissible when offered as 
admissions of negligence or fault.• The underlying reason for this princi-
ple is the public policy against discouraging the taking of such safety 
measures.2 There are, however, numerous exceptions to the rule. For 
example, proof of subsequent repairs is admissible to show control of the 
premise if that issue is in question.3 
The application of this rule to cautionary language contained in an 
automobile operator's manual was considered by the Court during the 
Survey year. In Schaeffer v. General Motors Corp., 4 the plaintiff charged 
the defendant automobile manufacturer with, among other things, neg-
ligence in failing to give adequate warning of the hazards associated 
with a specific type of "controlled differential" installed in certain of the 
cars it produced.5 The plaintiff alleged that the operation of this type 
of differential on wet surfaces caused him to be involved in an accident 
in which he sustained serious injuries.1 
At trial, the plaintiff sought to admit into evidence owner's manuals 
issued by the defendant in 1968, 1969 and 1970 which explained the 
operating characteristics of the controlled differential and which gave 
cautionary instructions on its use on slippery surfaces. The plaintiff's 
18 /d. 
§ 5.10. 1 C. McCoRMICK, EviDENCE § 275, at 666-69 (1972) [hereinafter cited as 
McCoRMICK]. 
At all events the courts do exclude, when offered as admissions of negligence or 
fault, evidence of remedial safety measures taken after an injury, such as repairs, 
changes in construction, installation of new safety devices such as lights, gates, or 
guards, changes in rules and regulations, changes in the practice of the business, 
or the discharge of an employee charged with causing the injury. 
/d. at 666-67 (footnotes omitted). 
2 /d. at 666. 
3 W. LEACH AND P. LIACOS, HANDBOOK OF MASSACHUSETfS EVIDENCE, at 201 (1967); other 
exceptions to the rule are discussed in McCORMICK, supra note 1, at 667-68. 
• 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. 498, 360 N.E.2d 1062. 
• /d. at 499, 360 N .E.2d at 1064. 
I /d. 
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automobile was manufactured in 1963. The operator's manual he re-
ceived at that time did not contain cautionary instruqtions relative to 
the differential. 7 
The trial judge admitted the three more recent manuals but "only as 
evidence of the operating characteristics of the differential and of the 
defendant's knowledge of the associated risks."8 The n)anuals were not 
permitted to go to the jury and the plaintiff was required to omit refer-
ence to certain cautionary language contained therein when discussing 
them in front of the jury. • 
On appeal, the Court determined that in so restrictililg the use of this 
evidence, the trial judge had committed error. 10 In particular, the Court 
ruled that manuals were also admissible "to prove the practical possibil-
ity of giving cautionary warnings," and that the ma~uals were thus 
relevant "in determining the defendant's duty to warn the plaintiff of 
the danger" posed by the differential. 11 
The result in this case is similar, at least in principle!, to that reached 
in doCanto v. Ametek, Inc., 12 where the Court held tliat evidence of a 
safety improvement made by a manufacturer after the sale of a machine 
but before injury to a plaintiff was admissible to prove the practical 
possibility of making such an improvement; the defendant's knowledge 
of the danger at the time of the injury; and the existence of the defen-
dant's duty to warn of the hazard. 13 
While the Court in Schaeffer deemed it neither nec~ssary nor advis-
able to consider whether the basic rule, which excludesi evidence of sub-
sequent remedial measures when offered as admissions of negligence 
or fault, has been overwhelmed by the growing num~er of exceptions 
thereto, 14 it is apparent that these exceptions have 'significantly re-
duced the effect of the rule on trial practice in Massachusetts. If this 
list of exceptions continues to grow, the Court may find. it necessary to 
consider whether, as a practical matter, the rule cont~nues to serve its 
original purpose of promoting the public policy which favors the taking 
of remedial measures. 
It may be argued that individuals, especially those who produce and 
distribute their products on a large scale, are motivated to take remedial 
steps primarily because they recognize that their fail~re to do so may 
greatly enlarge their exposure to liability to future purchasers and users 
1 ld. at 502-03, & n.1, 360 N.E.2d at 1065-66 & n.l. 
• I d. at 504, 360 N .E.2d at 1066. 
I /d. 
II /d. 
11 Id. at 503, 504, 360 N.E.2d at 1066. 
11 367 Mass. 776, 328 N.E.2d 873 (1975). 
13 /d. at 780-82, 328· N.E.2d at 876-77. 
" 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 503 n.2, 360 N.E.2d at 1066 n.2. 
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of their products. It is highly unlikely that the existence of this eroded 
rule of evidence is the determinative factor in the decision to make 
repairs or safety improvements. On the contrary, the rule, with all its 
exceptions, may well have relatively slight impact on those who must 
make such decisions.t5 If that is the case, then replacement of the tradi-
tional rule with one that more accurately reflects the current trend 
favoring the admission of evidence relating to subsequent remedial mea-
sures, at least in products liability cases, will not have the effect of 
discouraging such measures. 
The Court in Schaeffer also discussed the admissibility of the results 
of a computer simulation of the accident giving rise to the action. 18 
Ordinarily, "[j]udicial acceptance of a scientific theory or instrument 
can occur only when it follows a general acceptance by the community 
of scientists involved."17 Since there was disagreement among scientific 
authorities cited by the parties as to the reliability of computer simula-
tion, 18 the Court indicated that "the standard for admissibility of scien-
tific tests may not have been met in this instance."18 
To guard against the possibility of error if this evidence is offered on 
retrial of the action, the Court required that the trial judge 
(a) conduct a hearing in the absence of the jury on the question 
whether the tests conducted and results ascribed thereto meet the 
prescribed standards for the admissibility of such evidence, and 
(b) that he put into the record . . . the findings of fact made by 
him as a basis for the admission or exclusion of the evidence in 
question. 20 
15 Contra, McCoRMICK, supra note 1, at 668-69. 
11 "This evidence purported to show that the differential did not adversely affect the 
operation of the plaintiffs automobile. The simulation was based on a computer program 
developed by the Calspan Corporation, serving automobile manufacturers primarily, to 
predict the behavior of automobiles under a variety of circumstances." 1977 Mass. Adv. 
Sh. at 505, 360 N.E.2d at 1066. 
17 /d. at 506, quoting Commonwealth v. Fatalo, 346 Mass. 266, 269, 191 N .E.2d 479, 481 
(1963). This standard of admissibility for "scientific evidence" has been criticized. For 
example, in McCORMICK, supra note 1, the author says: 
"General scientific acceptance" is a proper condition for taking judicial notice of 
scientific facts, but not a criterion for the admissibility of scientific evidence. Any 
relevant conclusions which are supported by a qualified expert witness should be 
received unless there are other reasons for exclusion. Particularly, probative value 
may be overborne by the familiar dangers of prejudicing or misleading the jury, and 
undue consumption of time. If the courts used this approach, instead of repeating 
a supposed requirement of "general acceptance" not elsewhere imposed, they would 
arrive at a practical way of utilizing the results of scientific advances. 
Id. at 491. 
18 1977 Mass. Adv. Sh. at 506, 360 N.E.2d at 1067. 
II /d. 
" Id. at 507, 360 N.E.2d at 1067. 
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In light of the above, it is clear that the admission of ~vidence based 
upon computer simulation will receive more than cursor~ review by the 
Court; and it is, therefore, unlikely that such evidence ~ill be admitted 
at the trial level in the absence of solid proof that it mee~ the standard 
for admissibility as set forth in the Schaeffer opinion. ! 
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